

Communications  
to the Editor should  
be addressed  
to "The Polish  
Tribune."

PARIS:  
2, Place des  
Batignolles.

# The Polish Tribune

"Poland for the Poles."

LONDON  
143-4 Fleet Street,  
E.C.

LAUSANNE:  
Les Fauconnières,  
Chailly, Lausanne

Subscription:  
5/- per year  
(26 numbers).

N° 13

APRIL 1, 1916

REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION  
ABROAD

ONE PENNY

## What have we to expect from the Allies' Victory?

Referring lately to the countries that have suffered from the war: of the « martyr countries », M. Maurice Donnay enumerated « a portion of sweet France, heroic Belgium, noble Serbia, part of Great Russia » — and that is all ! He added that those countries deserved « the everlasting gratitude of the civilized world, and recompenses when the time came for the settlement of accounts ». And Poland? She is evidently nothing but a part of Great Russia... Thus, for Poland suffering, devastation and famine; and for Russia — « the eternal gratitude of the civilized world!... »

I have quoted M. Maurice Donnay; but I could have mentioned others, very numerous and of the ablest: politicians, diplomatists and historians. Involuntary, or wilful blindness, such appears to be the general opinion — or pretty nearly—in France, and such the conception of the duty towards Russia, the friend and ally.

We would point out first of all that in this respect people out-herod Herod himself: thus, it is often impossible to publish, in Paris, the translation of articles on the Polish question which have appeared in Petrograd by permission of the Censorship!

Again, what a curious policy is that which consists in closing one's eyes obstinately in order not to see a real fact; in considering as inexistent 20,000,000 of Poles; in leaving the field open for the « Danubian syrens », enslaved by Berlin, to do everything in their power to persuade the Poles that they have nothing to expect from the Allies, nothing—save, of course a few fine words dedicated to Poles « faithful to Great Russia ». (*Vide* Masson, Jean de Bonnefon, etc., etc.).

The simple truth is that there are no such Poles « faithful to Russia », any more than there exist any Poles faithful to Austria or to Prussia, for those faithful to either of these three States are vile and despicable renegades, despised by their own masters, at Berlin as well as in Petrograd. And yet if certain papers with a large circulation are to be believed, it might be thought that such renegades, though but few, are alone taken into account by the Allies.

Yet it would be so easy to persuade the Poles—the real Poles—those who remain *faithful to Poland, and to Poland alone*; it were so easy to induce the whole of the Polish nation to embrace the cause of the Allies; to throw into the scale all her enthusiasm, all there remains to her of her strength and blood. And twenty millions of people are to be reckoned with, be they even disarmed, and even were it a question of a position less important than that of Poland, where the least attempt against a railway may jeopardize for a time the provisioning in food and ammunition of some section of the front; it would be so easy, if the cause of the Allies became without any reserve whatever that of Poland!

The majority of the Polish nation distinctly took sides at the very outset of the war: the peasant in Russian Poland resisted the temptations coming from Austria (which nevertheless could be and really was in sympathy with the Poles). He readily obeyed the order for mobilization, frequently gave assistance to the Russian army not out of « fondness for Russia » (the words of a courtier, pronounced in the Duma) nor « loyalty to Slavism » (a word he had never heard in his life), but solely out of instinctive and traditional distrust of

the Prussian and every thing deriving from the Prussian. It is indeed a well-known fact that hatred of the Teuton is deeply rooted in the soul of the Polish people and dates back to the origin of Poland. The classes higher up adopted the same attitude—after a little irresolution—because their reasoning was perfectly in accord with the unreasoned instinct of the peasant. Reduced to the condition of vassal of Berlin, Austria was powerless to realize what might have been expected of her; and Germany, the pitiless Germanizer, the implacable and irreconcilable enemy, was infinitely more formidable than Russia because infinitely better organized, infinitely richer and more civilized.

Russification—slightly attenuated since 1905—had recourse to brutal means; it did incalculable evil by stifling education and all initiative towards progress. But, unsystematized, and applied by officials wielding wide powers, whose individual characters, personal relations and, it may be said, venality, left the door open to numerous exceptions (more or less illegal), it was above all administrative, political, policial; it wrought devastation, oppressed and depraved, but scarcely ever attained its end. In spite of everything the number of Poles who had forgotten or disowned their nationality remained insignificant.

Germanization, on the contrary, the staff of which—apart from the officials: inflexible, harsh, and incorruptible, like so many wheels in a piece of machinery—comprised the entire scientific and economical apparatus of the model Universities, powerful banks, commercial and industrial companies and a whole army of agricultural colonists—Germanization, intensifying from day to day, has succeeded in creating a German population in the very heart of a country hitherto exclusively Polish. In a word; in the event of an Austro-German victory there would remain but one all-powerful State: Germany, dominating all the nations of the world, some vassals, others slaves—all ready to obey her will.

On the other hand, the victory of the allies would give preponderance to a group of Powers, of about equal importance.

It is evident that where there exists but one State more powerful than all the rest of the world Liberty and Independence become but words without any meaning.

Independence—not only in name, but in fact—is possible for a nation, even comparatively weak, if it can manage skilfully among several great States.

The cause of liberty and independence has been, is, and will ever be that of Poland. Independence! The word has magic power for all Poles; the idea exerts and will always exert an invincible attraction.

The Austro-Germans have cleverly exploited its power, showing as a reality of the near past, as of the present, the rights and liberties the Galician Poles enjoyed (and still enjoy). They have caused half-promises to be uttered by semi-official personages; they publish now and again an interview on « the future peace » in which an « independent Poland » is alluded to; they have created and attached to the Austrian army « the Polish Legion », a real miniature army bearing Polish standards, using the Polish language and commanded by Polish officers; they have authorized the opening of a Polish University and a Polytechnic School,

both public, and also of Colleges, likewise Polish—all this in Warsaw itself, in Russian Poland they have occupied.

Certainly, the above are not precise and official concessions, and the Legion is too diminutive to become dangerous for them some day.

Yet the half-promises and newspaper articles keep up hopes; yet the Legion gives youth the illusion of a Polish armed force; yet the Polish schools, yet the partial use of the Polish language in the Law Courts constitute realities that were unknown, prohibited, and proscribed up to the very last moment of the Russian occupation.

The great majority of the population are distrustful! The people are convinced that the German « favours » are precarious. Yet they will not, they cannot wish a return to the old state of things; they no longer have faith in the fine words of Petrograd, fine words which still leave in force against the Poles still remaining under Russian rule all the oppressive restrictions and exceptions.

Germany's victory would be a disaster for us. What will the victory of the Allies be?

Is the cause of the Allies really our cause?

Should Poland wait passively, or would she be justified in making one last attempt—to bring to the aid of the Allies what remains to her of her strength after all these unprecedented ravages?

That is the question we put.

I maintain it is of the utmost importance *for the Allies*.

Can the attitude of the Polish population living throughout the extent of the hundreds of miles separating the German front from their revictualled centres—can the attitude of the population established along the lines of communication be of no interest to the Allies?

Can it be indifferent to them that this population should be a dumb and passive witness of everything; should allow itself without resistance to be requisitioned for the repair of roads, the manufacture of munitions, etc., or, on the contrary, should itself become the enemy of the German army; hide or destroy the requisitioned materials or provisions; shirk or even resist by refusing to work the requisitions for labour; place obstacles in the way of the circulation of trains; in a word, that the Germans should be able to obtain the execution of the least of their orders only by main force?

No, that cannot be indifferent to them.

The passive attitude of the people removes from the Germans the obligation of watching the interior of the country, leaves free a large number of their forces, allows them to transport their troops easily in every direction—and to despatch them to other fronts.

The reverse behaviour, openly hostile, would require a far greater number of their forces to watch the interior of the country; would bring about interruptions in the revictualled of the front and difficulties in communications by railway; render the movements of troops difficult and often dangerous; would introduce a state of insecurity the marvellous organization of the Germans itself would be incapable of resisting, and turn any retreat into a disaster.

The revolutionary years 1904-1905 have shown what such a struggle could be in Poland though carried on only by a small portion of the popula-

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tion (enjoying the more or less active sympathy of the great mass). But a struggle of the kind, a strife worse than the most sanguinary war, a struggle entailing unnamed horrors and numberless and boundless sacrifices—such a struggle could be entered into only under the influence of an incentive of the most powerful kind.

There is but one aim, a unique ideal for which the Poles would gladly sacrifice everything, and that is

#### A FREE AND INDEPENDENT POLAND.

Give us a tangible reality, a beginning of the realization of Polish independence—by a solemn instrument bearing the signatures of all the Allied Powers guaranteeing the reconstitution of an independent Poland, to comprise the Polish countries of the three coparticipants!

But if we are given words, more words and always words; if it is sought to ignore us; if we are promised the payment for our blood, our conflagrations, our tears in « eternal gratitude and by recompenses » which will benefit Russia—at our expense...

For it is useless to quibble over words: Russia, dominant, however « magnanimous » she may be, cannot give satisfaction to Poland. She cannot do so for the reason that she cannot give up—save in short moments of enthusiasm—the desire to unify her immense Empire and, consequently, to Russify everything that is not Russian. History, even the history of the past few months, is there to prove it: schemes for the autonomy (how little autonomous!) of Poland; modifications (illegal, considering they were decreed without prior consultation of the Diet) of the Constitution of Finland. She cannot give satisfaction to Poland because the latter cannot renounce her independence without believing the whole of her millenary history, without disowning all her traditions—she, the Republic of the XVIIIth Century, aristocratic, it is true, but with a free nobility, and making no legal distinction between a great lord and the petty nobleman in his service, both electors of their Kings, and forming at the beginning of the XVIIIth Century an important portion of the population.

Under Russian domination Poland would continue to be a Poland in revolt against Russian oppression—as autonomy could only be a short-lived intermission.

Between the tendency not only of the Government but of the whole of Russia towards unity, and the desire, nay the imperious need of independence and liberty which is the very essence of the Polish soul, any compromise, any attempt at an arrangement is foredoomed to failure. Exactly one hundred years ago Alexander I proclaimed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland, attached by a purely personal union, to the Russian Empire. Immediately afterwards the Grand-Duke Constantine, « Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army » committed the first acts of violence and trod under foot that Constitution, which foundered in the disaster of 1831.

In 1861-62, there occurred further attempts, far more timid, which led to the Polish rising in 1863 and to a merciless persecution of everything Polish. Down to the troublous times of the Russo-Japanese war the days following on the utterance of conciliatory words at St-Petersburg or at Warsaw have invariably witnessed more stringency in anti-Polish measures and fresh and deeper rancour in all Polish hearts.

If such is the fate the Allies' victory is reserving for us, we must husband and develop as much as possible our energies for the future struggle. We shall need them to defend our existence, when, Germany crushed, France, Great Britain and Italy « fighting for the liberty of nations » shall have reinstated the Russian constable, once more all-powerful; will have have introduced him to Cracow; when « in the name of civilization » they shall have caused the schools to be closed (that could be opened only after the departure of the Russians) and, « in the name of justice » caused the Polish language to be proscribed once more (proscribed down to the last moment of the Russian occupation and still prohibited wherever there are Poles under the Russian yoke); when they shall have, « in the name of the right of all nationalities », made all offices accessible to the Poles, on condition that they

abjure their faith and become Russian and Orthodox. We shall need them to continue that more than secular struggle that can come to an end only when Poland shall recovered her freedom and independence.

By their counsels and influence, the Western Allies can give Russia (compensated and aggrandized in another direction, there being no lack of spoils!) either a quiet and peaceful neighbour—independent Poland—or a large province eternally in effervescence, revolt and blood—Poland subject, oppressed and indomitable.

Which of these two solutions is most worthy of the champions of civilization and of the true friends of Russia?

J. WIEL.

P.-S. — *The above article was already set up when we read in Paris-Midi the following despatch:*

« GERMANY PROCLAIMS THE AUTONOMY OF POLAND »

« London, Jan. 14, 1916.

« It is reported from Milan to the Daily Chronicle that according to information from a diplomatic source Germany has the intention of proclaiming shortly the autonomy of Poland.

« Her intention is to establish compulsory service to fill the enormous breaches already made in her army. »

According to calculations made by competent persons, the Germans could easily raise, in that case, an army of at least 400,000 men, and attract to her munition workshops some 150,000 to 200,000 workmen.

Up to the present the Poles, by a very active propaganda, have done everything in their power to stop the emigration of labour. In order that this propaganda, as difficult as it is perilous, may have a solid basis and that the unfortunate men who are dying of hunger may find the strength to continue their resistance, it is necessary that a prompt and categorical declaration by the Allies should prove to them that their sufferings are not in vain but will lead to the independence of their country.

NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

## Towards Reconciliation Memorial presented TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA IN 1912

The following is a perfectly authentic document, one which proves that well-advised minds foresaw as early as 1912 the dangers incurred by Russia through her anti-Polish policy.

The Memorial in question was presented to the Emperor of Russia towards the end of the year 1912 by twelve Members of the Duma and the Imperial Council—among them being Messrs. Chomiakow, former President of the Duma, Senator Saburow, former Minister of Public Instruction, Prince Lwow, Baron Meller and Zakomehski. M. Kokowitzow, President of the Council of Ministers introduced the deputation, and M. Sazonow supported the desiderata of the Memorial. But M. Kokowitzow was not strong enough to overcome the opposition of the bureaucracy; and shortly afterwards he was even compelled to give up office.

« The question of the policy of Russia towards the Slav peoples is laid down in all its amplitude.

« The following problem confronts us: To conciliate mutual animosities and discords and draw together all the Slavonic populations in the name of one common ideal: Slav unity. But that task is scarcely realizable so long as we shall not have settled between ourselves the old quarrel of the two sister-nations: Poles and Russians.

« The situation of the Polish nation, torn to pieces between Russia, Germany, and Austria, is profoundly tragic.

« In Prussia the Poles are subject to a rule of grinding oppression which aims at the annihilation of their nationality. In Austria they are attracted by the lure of concessions and privileges in the wake

of that very Germanic policy which represents for their national development so terrible a menace. Finally, in Russia—that is, in a Slavonic State—the Polish nation does not find sufficient guarantees for her rights to existence, rights conferred upon her by her high qualities of civilization and her historic past.

« It were judicious, in view of the community of vital and national interests, to seek a solution for all these reciprocal antagonisms and put an end to a deplorable animosity, pernicious alike for both nations.

« The importance of seeking the means for a reconciliation with the Polish people has never been greater than at the present moment.

« It behoves Russia to prepare at home to repel a German onslaught.

« Apart from that consideration of a moral order pleading the necessity of improving the lot of the Poles, it must be borne in mind how important it were, in the point of view of purely military considerations to attract to the side of Russia the sympathies of the Polish population.

« Throughout the length of our Western frontiers from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, in Polish Russia as in Austria and Germany, there dwells a compact Polish population of over twenty million souls.

« The question of the defence of our own frontier would present insuperable difficulties in the case of the malevolence of the Poles towards us. The adaptation of the territorial system of mobilization appears to us risky and almost inapplicable. The transfer of our line of defence inland would result in the relinquishment by us into the hands of the enemy, of an important territory, and entail on us the loss of all the advantages of an offensive based on such a magnificent fortified territory as the Kingdom of Poland—a stronghold that had already drawn the attention of the Emperor Napoleon I.

« It is impossible to be blind to the fact that the policy applied to the Kingdom of Poland—policy that can only foster the enmity of the Poles towards Russia—cannot give any result.

« As soon as the insurrection of 1863 came to an end Miliutine and Prince Tcherkassky introduced reforms intended to gain over the rural populations to the Russian side. A series of measures were adopted with a view to improving the condition of the peasantry. Autonomous local bodies were established, and the Polish language was preserved both in the elementary and the higher schools; for at that period, it never entered the mind of the Government of Alexander II to use the school as a political and Russifying instrument.

« But such was not the case; and official practices oblivion repressive measures directed against the Poles became intensified instead of diminishing. They soon took a more threatening character and ended by constituting a perfect system of oppression of the Polish nationality and of Russification to the death.

« It is natural that a deep resentment should have been stirred up in the hearts of those who had to bear that tyranny. It might have been expected that the Manifesto of October 17th would have put an end to all that sad past.

« But such was not the case; and official practices on the spot continue as before. This state of things has no other effect than to exasperate the Polish population and lower its cultural level, and in no way to contribute to the triumph of Russian culture or the progress of Russian policy.

« The old administrative system of the Kingdom of Poland endures through sheer routine, thanks to rooted habits the authorities cannot shake off.

« Yet the Central Government possesses no plan of action capable of enabling it to emerge from the dead-lock the Polono-Russian relations have reached. It is impossible to continue the present policy; and we lack the power to inaugurate a better one; thus a question of enormous political moment is adjourned from day to day, thus adding to the confusion of the situation.

« The war against the Polish nature of the country continues to be felt as keenly in the educational question as in the method of administration and in the domain of economic life.

« The old traditions of the Administration of Education tend to restrict and lessen the preroga-

tives conceded the Polish language in schools by the *Ukase* of October 27th 1905. School-masters of Polish birth are removed and pupils from Russian provinces are enticed to the Training Colleges. Things have resulted in an absolutely abnormal situation, in consequence of which and the *Ukase* of October 27th notwithstanding, the education of children is confided to teachers who are strangers to the local population and possess but an imperfect knowledge of Polish.

« In april 1905, the Ministers in Council declared that schools in Poland could not have for object the denationalization of Polish pupils, and considered it was time Polish children and youth should be afforded the possibility of studying in their mother-tongue. Yet the reorganization of Secondary Education did not take place in accordance with that principle; the Minister of Public Instruction was merely empowered to license, as a provisional measure, the opening of Secondary schools, with Polish as the medium for tuition.

« A policy of the kind only embittered the national struggle and brought about the boycott of the State Colleges. By an intense concentration of all its energies Polish society strove to maintain the private schools, for it saw in these institutions a counterpoise to the Russian schools kept up by the State.

« It may be said that Secondary Education in Poland has been thoroughly disorganized, and that a most acute effervescence has broken out among the youth attending the schools.

« In the hands of the Administration of Public Instruction the Elementary school has been and still remains but a weapon for the anti-Polish policy, a course that does not tend to strengthen Russian influence, but on the contrary, to lower the intellectual level of the national masses and increase the number of the illiterate.

« The want of Higher Polish Schools and the obstacles thrown in the way of Secondary tuition in the Polish language drive thousands upon thousands of youths to seek instruction beyond the boundaries of the Empire, cause an irreparable loss in the intellectual development of young Poles, and intensify the aversion and animosity of the rising generations.

« Already in 1905 the Ministers in Council had protested against the absence of the local element in the Administration, an absence that reacts unfavourably on public order and the course of business in the country. The questions of Schools, public health and assistance to the poor are placed on a lower footing than those of the Central Russian Provinces.

« In their declaration, the Government repeatedly dwelt on the absolute necessity of introducing autonomy for Town Councils and the *Ziemi* in the Kingdom of Poland. The former President of the Council of Ministers, M. Stolypine himself, considered that the Municipalities of the towns in the Kingdom of Poland should be Polish.

« In the meantime years were rolling by, and the *Ziemi* question was definitely shelved by the Minister of the Interior; as to Municipal autonomy, it seems that every hope has to be given up, not only to see it become Polish; but even ever to see it framed in a law.

« Nothing tends more to inflame public opinion and to inspire more distrust of a Government, than a policy of promises and deceptions; nothing could discredit more the social movements that are seeking a basis for an understanding than incoherence of the kind on the part of the governmental power.

« If to the above be added the feelings of hatred towards the Poles displayed by a section of Russian society, and that those feelings influence the trend of the Government policy, it will be conceived why the past few years have been a period of deceptions for all those who labour so sincerely to improve the relations between the Polish and Russian nations.

« It were a mistake to suppose that only the higher classes of Polish society feel irritation over the policy of the Government. Discontent has penetrated to the very depths of the populations of the towns and of the country. Every Polish workman, every countryman must necessarily feel that his treatment at the hands of the Authorities is different to that meted out to Russians, and this solely because he is a Pole and a Catholic.

« On account of their origin, Poles are fated to suffering and injustice: in their schools, their econ-

omic life, the public services and that of the State.

« The saddest part of it all is that the behaviour of the Government could only be explained by the supposition that the object it had in view was the denationalization of the Poles. But, considering that such a plan had been set aside and considered unfeasible, as was demonstrated by an experience of fifty years, it is indispensable to discover a different method and enter upon it with decision without ever reverting to the past.

« Clear and precise instructions emanating from the Central Government are indispensable.

« The Polish public expects that the Manifesto of Oct. 17 shall be carried out, and be applied to the Kingdom of Poland. It is necessary to demonstrate that such a hope is not in vain, and that the Government is ready to modify the harsh intercourse established between the local authorities and the people.

« It is not meet that the Polish population should look upon every head of District, every Governor, every Director of public schools and every teacher as an enemy of their race and culture. It were desirable that in the relations of daily life the population should not meet with animosity at the hands of the representatives of Russian power, but by justice and kindness.

« A change in Russian policy towards the Kingdom of Poland has become all the more feasible that half a century has now elapsed since the insurrection in 1863; that new generations have arisen; that social preponderance has passed from the upper classes to more democratical classes, who have laid down as a national principle, in the first place, the intellectual and economic prosperity of the popular masses.

« *Every delay opposed to the indispensable reforms will force the Polish public to seek other means of escaping from an unbearable situation and drive it into the arms of those who have benefited enormously from the quarrels among Slav nations and labour for the triumph of Germanism.*

« Now, the more we feel forewarned against further attempts at encroachment by Germanism—not at all out of race antagonism but out of concern for the interests of Russia—the more pressingly does there devolve on the Administration the duty of applying to the Kingdom of Poland a judicious policy.

« The present is an exceptionally grave moment, but also an exceptionally propitious one

« THE DANGER OF AN INTENSIFIED GERMANISM forces the Poles of the kingdom of Poland in a like manner to gravitate towards Russia. The same danger evokes in Russia the desire of finding in them devoted Allies and not secret enemies.

« It depends on Russia alone to draw to herself the sympathies of the whole of the Slavonic family without exception, to stultify wicked calumnies and grounded accusations and render powerless Austria, that crafty and powerful enemy—through our own faults.

« It depends on Russia alone to cease living in the remembrance of old errors, atoned for since, and adopt a policy worthy of her and her history, that which places her at the head of the reawakened Slavonic world. »

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This document

1) Demonstrates that all the facts quoted for the past twelvemonths in our publications were absolutely correct;

2) It explains why the Russian Press was forbidden to speak of « autonomy » before the occupation of Poland by the Austro-Germans, and the boycotting of the Grand Duke's Manifesto by the Russian Government.

3) It justifies completely the distrust reigning in Poland, where no one entertains the slightest illusion over the realization of any real autonomy granted by the Russian bureaucracy.

People in Petrograd are convinced that the bureaucracy would make up its mind to accept the idea of the independence of Poland—which, by the way, is demanded by a section of the Russian people themselves—rather than that of autonomy, which would be in complete disagreement with the secular system prevailing, and likely to prevail for a long time to come, in Russia.

W. P.

## A curious conversation with M. Goremykine

A few months ago M. Goremykine, President of the Council of Ministers in Russia, invited to his house Mr. C., one of the best known Polish members of the Council of Empire. He put several questions to his guest, requesting him to reply in an absolutely frank manner, as if he were speaking not to the Minister, but to the private gentleman.

The following conversation ensued:

M. GOREMYKINE. — The first question I ought to put is « What do the Poles want? » But the reply thereto may be guessed, for every one knows they want Independence; and that is natural enough, it could not be otherwise.

M. C. — Assuredly. Poland, a country with a glorious past and a population of over twenty millions of inhabitants will never renounce its right to independence. Any half-measure in the solution of that question would be an injustice towards Poland and a danger for Europe. If Poland does not reconquer her independence at the present time, she will obtain it after a fresh conflict in Europe, conflict that could be avoided did there but exist an independent Poland.

M. GOREMYKINE. — Were independence to be granted Poland would she be capable of reviving and of living, in an economical point of view?

M. C. — Up to the present Poland has suffered, beyond comparison, far more than unfortunate Belgium. Not to speak of other losses, the material devastation of our country represents hundreds of millions sterling. In spite of that, granted that she be indemnified for these losses, Poland possesses all the necessary elements for her economical development; and she would occupy one of the leading positions among the European States. It must be borne in mind that, in the European Concert, an independent Poland will occupy a higher rank not only than Montenegro, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, Hungary, Sweden, Norway and Portugal, but even a higher place than Spain.

Nor must it be forgotten that she would dispose of an army of three million men, a fact that would constitute an element of the highest importance for the future balance of power in Europe.

M. GOREMYKINE. — Towards what European Power would independent Poland lean, and what alliance would she seek?

M. C. — That is a rather complicated problem, one that would depend entirely on the circumstances under which independence would have been granted to Poland. One thing certain is that, in questions of this kind, political interests are of far greater importance than economical interests. A State which seeks in full sincerity to come to an understanding with her neighbours and to afford full satisfaction to their legitimate claims, can always rely on a cordial and lasting alliance with them.

Were the Allies, without wasting precious time or waiting for the Congress, to recognize the independence of Poland, the latter would link her fate with theirs.

M. GOREMYKINE. — What is your idea of the political situation of an independent Poland, and to whom would you offer the throne?

M. C. — I think that the future Congress, in granting Poland her independence, would make it an obligation on her part to establish a Royal Power. As to the person to be designated to occupy the throne of Poland, there would be no difficulty in finding one. Up to the present, for thrones newly created it has been the custom to choose from among German princes. Why should not a series of Kings of the Romanoff dynasty be inaugurated?

M. GOREMYKINE. — Yes, that is worth examining. Besides, I have already conferred at great length with His Majesty on all these questions.

## The Russians in Galicia

As far back as the 20th October last, the Russian paper *Rietch* published a letter which M. Skobelew, a member of the Duma, had received from Irghiz (Siberia) from a Greco-Catholic priest named Emil Dolnitzki. The latter implored the help of

M. Skobelew to get him recalled from exile. The letter also contained the following petition addressed to the Minister of the Interior :

« For no reason whatever I, the Uniat parish-priest of Baworow, in the Prefecture of Tarnopol, was thrown into prison and deported by stages to Irghiz, in the Province of Tourgäi (Siberia), where, old (I am over 64), ill, and without means of subsistence I am dragging out my life.

« I would not be converted to orthodoxy, which is being imposed upon us all by force; and that is why I was torn from my family, which thus remains in distress. I implore Your Excellency, in the name of Heaven, to restore to me my liberty.

« I shall not live long; permit me to die in my country, in the midst of my relations. »

Thousands of analogous facts explain the famous despatch in bad taste sent by the Ruthenes to solicit the protection of the Kaiser.

One can easily understand the terror the Ruthenes display over the idea of the possible return of the Russians to Galicia ; yet the Russians are supposed to be fighting « for the liberation of the Slavs! »

## Two Historical Documents

With reference to the so-called historical pretensions of Russia on Eastern Galicia, it may be interesting to refer to two historical documents, two Declarations by Czars—viz. :

1. In the Polanow Treaty (1637), signed by Ladislaus IV., King of Poland, and Michael Federowitch, Czar of Moscow, the first Czar of the Romanoff dynasty, Art. IV. stipulates :

« The King of Poland recognizes the Grand Duke Michael Federowitch as Autocrat Czar of All the Moscovite Russias without that title giving him any right whatsoever over the Ruthenias, which belong ab antiquo to Poland. »

2. Catharine II., in 1764, through her Ambassador, made the following Declaration to the Polish Republic :

« People often fear what is not to be feared ; and that is how a danger was apprehended from the title of « Empress of All the Russias. » In order that all should know and be witness to the spirit of equity and friendly dispositions of the Empress of All the Russias towards the Most Serene Polish Republic and Grand Duchy of Lithuania, be it said once for all that Her Majesty, our august Sovereign, in assuming the title of Empress of All the Russias, does not intend to take any right either for herself, her successors, or her Empire, over the countries and lands which, under the name of Russias or Ruthenias, belong to Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ; and recognising their domination she offers on the contrary to the Most Serene Polish Republic a guarantee for the preservation of its rights and privileges, as well as of the countries and lands belonging to it by right or that it may possess at the present time; and she promises always to aid and protect it against whoever might attempt to disturb same. »

## The Chancellor -- was mistaken!

We find in the Chancellor's reply to Scheidemann's speech the following sentence :

« The English Minister of the Colonies wants to realize the principle of nationalities, and by that victory give back Alsace-Lorraine to France and Poland to Russia... It is at least doubtful whether, according to the principle of nationalities, Poland really belongs to Russia. (Much laughter) ».

The great laughter of the Reichstag would be completely justified were M. Bethmann-Hollweg's quotation correct. Luckily for the Allies it is absolutely false.

According to the *Temps* of Nov. 16, this is the sentence to which the Chancellor referred :

« Replying to the speech of Mr. Trevelyan, a

notorious pacifist, Mr. Bonar Law, Colonial Minister, said :

« We are as determined as on the first day of the war not to weaken in our efforts before the Allies have caused to triumph the cause for which they have drawn the sword.

« You have said you did not want peace until Germany was ready to evacuate Belgium and to remodel the world conformably with the principle of nationalities. Do you think Germany would give up Alsace to France or Poland to the Poles ? »

It is therefore clear that the Chancellor... made a mistake, not to say more, in seeking to throw ridicule on England and France.

The representatives of these two great Democracies have often and again expressed themselves on the object of the present gigantic struggle. No one has the right to doubt their honesty and their sincerity. It is indubitable that in countersigning « the greatest crime in history » these two Democracies would dishonour themselves for ever.

In reinstating Poland in her rights to independence they will be rendering the greatest service to Europe and to Russia, their Ally.

## Duplicity of the German Social-Democracy

The majority of the Socialist party in the Reichstag deputed to the rostrum as their mouth-piece, M. LANDSBERG, the member notorious for his annexationist opinions.

Now LEDEBOUR, a Member of the Opposition, accuses Landsberg, in the following terms, of having advocated among the party the scheme for the annexation of a portion of Poland, and this for strategic reasons.

« The better to understand the Landsberg scheme » says M. Ledebour, « it is well to understand that the annexation of the line of the Narew would likewise imply the annexation of Polish territories on the left bank of the Niemen. This would represent a territory with from 4 to 5 millions of non-German inhabitants. This difficulty Landsberg has sought to evade by this dilemma :

« But who are the people that live out there? They are Poles and Jews. Now if they are placed before this proposition : « Do they prefer to return to the Russian *knout* or to be annexed to the German Empire »—will they not all decide for Germany ?

« Now for the inhabitants of these territories as for all Social-Democrats the question lies in nowise as Landsberg puts it : the Russian *knout* or the Prussian ferule. The question lies this way : « Do you wish to be placed under a foreign domination : Russian, Prussian, or Austrian, or do you wish to belong to an independent Polish State. » And if the question be put in that way we may be quite sure the Poles to a man will declare themselves for an independent Poland, the dream of all Poles who still retain a spark of the sentiment of their dignity and honour.

« The spokesmen of the majority find the courage to put forward the most baneful schemes of annexation at the same time as these very same representatives affirm before public opinion that they, also, are opposed to annexations!... »

This shameful conduct on the part of the majority of the German Social-Democrats does not astonish us in the least. We have been aware for a long time that, at bottom, there existed no difference between them and the famous « Hakatists », who sought the extermination of the Polish nation.

## TOWARDS RECONCILIATION

The Russian Ministry of the Interior has declared *unacceptable* the resolution, moved by the Polish Club in the Duma, proposing the suppression of restrictions on the rights of the Poles in Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia, where the situation of the Poles is identical with that existing in Poznan under the Prussian ferule.

So much towards the Russo-Polish reconciliation!

## The Partitions of Poland <sup>(1)</sup>

The reviewer of a book written by a foreigner on Poland is usually confronted with one of two difficulties : Either it happens—perhaps with good reason—that the foreign writer is biased against Poland, or, if he be sympathetic, he may be insufficiently equipped for so difficult a problem. The Polish question, involving as it does the history of a nation for a thousand years, and the knowledge of an enormous territory, can be dealt with only by a scientist of the first rank. Yet up to the present a great number of the books on Poland have either been intended to prove that her enemies were right in bringing about her destruction as a State, or were the work of some sympathetic journalist whose only title to write about Poland was perhaps the superficial knowledge to be gained by a visit of a few months. To criticise books of the two foregoing types is a most difficult task. In the one case it is necessary to correct a number of wilful misstatements : in the other to praise the unscientific and often valueless gossip of a journalist who wishes to be kind to his Polish friends and to help the cause of Poland by a romantic description of the country and her people.

In the case of Lord Eversley there are no such difficulties. His work is both, unbiased and scientific. He has approached the subject with an open mind and has studied it thoroughly. Though he arrives at a conclusion which is perhaps not entirely satisfactory to the Poles who, as Mr. Dmowski declared at a meeting of the second Duma, will never abandon the hope of becoming again an independent state; yet the fact that at this critical moment Lord Eversley has attached the weight of his great name to a masterly work of great value in which he touches in a friendly way the wounds of Poland, has won for him the gratitude of the Polish nation.

Doubtless there are points in Lord Eversley's work which will meet with criticism from Polish historians. But these are perhaps due to the fact that he does not know the Polish language. In the first place, he does not lay sufficient stress on the fact that Poland was not partitioned at the time of her greatest disorganisation. On the contrary, the tragedy took place when reforms brought about in the eighteenth century began to show that the Polish State was becoming sufficiently strong to prove the efficiency of democracy. It was then that the neighbouring autocrats determined to crush this « everlasting source of Constitutional disease » which they feared might set a bad example to their own docile people. We also feel that to one man Lord Eversley is not quite just : and that is Kosciuszko. By quoting his letter to the Czar Alexander and not mentioning what follows, Lord Eversley creates the impression that Kosciuszko gave up the hope of an independent Poland and agreed to a self-governing Poland under Russia. This, however, was not the case, Kosciuszko saw that the guarantees given by the Czar were insufficient. He refused to come back to a Poland under foreign rule; and this resolution was carried out even after his death, for he desired that his heart should remain in Switzerland until it could find everlasting rest in a free Poland. This wish of the great patriot was complied with, and it is hoped that shortly his heart will be brought back to the land he loved so dearly.

(1) *The Partitions of Poland*, by Lord Eversley, with 6 illustrations and 4 maps. London : T. Fisher Unwin. Price, 7 s. 6 d.